Legislation and Policy Brief
Volume 4 | Issue 1

Article 1

4-27-2012

The Americans with Disabilities Act: Should the
Amendments to the Act Help Individuals with
Mental Illness?
Abigail J. Schopick

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/lpb
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Disability Law Commons, Health Law
Commons, and the Legislation Commons
Recommended Citation
Schopick, Abigail J. (2012) "The Americans with Disabilities Act: Should the Amendments to the Act Help Individuals with Mental
Illness?," Legislation and Policy Brief: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/lpb/vol4/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Legislation and Policy Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Legislation & Policy Brief

7

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: SHOULD THE
AMENDMENTS ACT HELP INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS?
Abigail J. Schopick*
Introduction . .............................................................................................. 7
I. Background ....................................................................................... 8
II. Individuals with Mental Illnesses Should be More
Successful Under the ADAAA Than They Were Under
the ADA............................................................................................. 16
A. Coverage Under the ADA for Individuals with
Mental Illness............................................................................ 16
B. Coverage for Individuals with Mental Illness
Post-ADAAA Passage............................................................... 24
Conclusion . ............................................................................................... 32
Introduction
On July 26, 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed into law the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).1 The ADA was intended to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities2 by
expanding the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act) to cover people with disabilities in need of coverage from a non-federal employer or entity.3
Unfortunately, due to a number of Supreme Court cases narrowing the
focus of the ADA,4 the individuals that were intended by Congress to
have full protection under the law were no longer assured adequate
coverage.5 In 2008, in response to the narrowing of the definition of
disability and the serious restrictions on the term “substantially limits”
that resulted from Supreme Court decisions that led to poor employee success rates, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
*J.D. Candidate 2012, American University Washington College of Law; B.A. Tulane University,
2005. I would like to thank my friends and family for their support while writing this paper. I
would also like to thank Professor Robert Dinerstein for his assistance and guidance throughout
the writing process. Additionally, I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Legislation &
Policy Brief for their work in editing and preparing this piece for publication
1
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
2
Id. at § 2.
3
Stephanie Proctor Miller, Comment, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment
Discrimination on the Basis of Psychiatric Disability, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 701, 704 (1997).
4
See Toyota Motor Mnfr. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (holding that for a major life activity
to be considered substantially limiting under the ADA it has to severely restrict the individual’s
ability to do a task of central importance to an average person’s daily life); see also Sutton v.
United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (determining that whether or not an individual is disabled
under the ADA needs to be determined with the consideration of mitigating measures).
5
See Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
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(ADAAA).6 Congress passed this legislation to “restore the intent and
protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”7 President
George W. Bush signed the ADAAA into law on September 25, 2008.8
The ADAAA went into effect on January 1, 2009.9
This paper will argue that although there have been no decisions
thus far applying the ADAAA to cases of discrimination against individuals suffering from mental illness, the amendments enacted in
2008 should result in greater coverage for such individuals. Part I of
this paper will examine the history leading up to the passage of the
ADAAA, including the failures of the ADA and the decisions by the
Supreme Court that severely limited the scope of the ADA.10 Part II
will examine the ADAAA and analyze the impact it should have on
cases brought by individuals discriminated against on the basis of their
mental illnesses.11 This discussion will include examining the language
of the statute as well as regulations and guidances that should be used
to assist courts in protecting the rights of individuals who fall within
the scope of the ADAAA because of their mental illnesses. Finally, the
paper will conclude that under the ADAAA, individuals with mental
illnesses should not continue to have the difficulties in prevailing in
discrimination suits that they did under the ADA.12
I. Background
The ADAAA was passed by Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush on September 25, 2008.13 Congress passed the
ADAAA after decisions by the Supreme Court severely eroded the
legislative intent of the original disability protection legislation, the
ADA.14
The primary purpose of the ADA was “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.”15 Between the ADA (private entities) and the Rehab Act (public entities), theoretically, all individuals
with disabilities would now be protected from harmful discrimination
Id.
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
See infra pp. 8-16.
11
See infra pp. 16-31.
12
See infra pp. 31-32.
13
Id.
14
Id.; see Toyota Motor Mnfr. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (holding that for a major life activity to be considered substantially limiting under the ADA it has to severely restrict the individual’s ability to do a task of central importance to an average person’s daily life); Sutton v. United
Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (determining that whether or not an individual is disabled under
the ADA needs to be determined with the consideration of mitigating measures).
15
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b)(1), 104 Stat. 327, amended
by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
6
7
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on the basis of a disability. The ADA defines a disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”16 In terms
of mental illnesses, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) Regulations further elaborate that a mental illness is considered “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.”17
Despite the ultimate addition of mental illness and psychological
disorders in the final version of the ADA, there were a few members
of Congress who believed that such disorders should not be included
in the legislation.18 Fortunately, those members were unsuccessful in
their attempts. There were, however, a number of disorders that are
classified as mental or psychological disorders that were specifically
denied coverage under the ADA.19 These disorders include “transvestitism, transexualism, pedophilia, . . . gender identity disorders, . . . compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania.” 20 Additionally, the law
excludes disorders stemming from the use of illegal drugs.21
In addition to having the qualifying disability, the individual must
show that his or her disability “substantially limits” a major life activity.22 Although the ADA itself did not define “substantially limits,” the
EEOC Regulations defined “substantially limits” as
(i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii)
[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in
the general population can perform that same major life
activity.23
With the combination of the statutory definition and the EEOC
Regulations, individuals with mental illnesses, who were discriminated against on the basis of these illnesses, should have been covered by
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2009).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2011).
18
See 135 Cong. Rec. S10765-803 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (debate between Sens. Helms and
Harkin).
19
Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness, Employment Discrimination, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 79, 102-03 (2006) (discussing the preand post-enactment debate on including personality disorders in the ADA’s scope).
20
42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2000).
21
42 U.S.C. § 12210(a).
22
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
23
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2009).
16
17
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the ADA because mental illness will often have an impact on major life
activities of individuals and is specifically mentioned in the definition
of disability.24
Unfortunately, that is not what happened. In 1999, the Supreme
Court decided Sutton v. United Air Lines,25 a case involving identical
twins with severe myopia who applied for jobs with United Air Lines
as global airline pilots.26 The twins were denied the jobs, despite having
the requisite experience, because their uncorrected vision was worse
than 20/200, even though their corrected vision was normal,27 and
United Air Lines had a requirement that all pilots have uncorrected vision no worse than 20/100.28 Therefore, according to United Air Lines,
the twins were not qualified for the jobs for which they were applying.29 The issue before the Court was whether an individual’s disability
should be evaluated with reference to his or her mitigated or unmitigated state.30 The Court ultimately decided that an individual claiming
protection because of a disability needs to be considered in his or her
mitigated state, taking into consideration any factors that may make
the individual seem and act normal, despite his or her disability.31
The Supreme Court had a number of justifications for this decision.
First, the Court stated that within the statute, the phrase “substantially
limits” is in the “present indicative verb form,” which indicates to the
Court that courts need to examine the person as he or she is, not as
the person hypothetically would or could be without the mitigating
measure.32 The Supreme Court’s second justification for its decision
was that the ADA requires an individualized inquiry as to whether a
person should be considered disabled under the statute.33 The Court
reasoned that it would become impossible to truly have individualized
inquiries if Congress intended individuals to be judged in their unmitigated states because of the time that would be required to actually
carry out such an inquiry for every person.34 The Court made this determination because viewing a plaintiff in his or her unmitigated and
therefore hypothetical state would require viewing all plaintiffs with
similar illnesses or disabilities as a group instead of individually.35 The
determination would then have to be made based upon what the ill42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2009).
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
26
Id. at 475.
27
Id. at 476.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 481.
31
Id. at 482 (“[M]itigating mesures must be taken into account when judging whether that person is ‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under the Act.”).
32
Id. at 482.
33
Id. at 483.
34
Id.
35
Id.
24
25
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ness or disability could cause for the individual instead of what it is
actually causing for the individual.36 The final justification for the Supreme Court’s decision centers on Congress’s finding, in the ADA, that
43 million Americans have some type of mental or physical disability.37
The Court reasoned that if Congress intended for people to be considered in their unmitigated states, especially given the number of people
who wear some type of corrective lenses, the number provided by Congress would have to be higher than 160 million.38 For these reasons, the
Supreme Court announced its decision to require courts to determine
a plaintiff’s disability status on the basis of how the individual is in his
or her mitigated state.
In his dissent in Sutton, Justice Stevens discussed what he believed
was Congress’s actual intent in the ADA.39 According to Justice Stevens, Congress clearly intended people who chose to mitigate their
disabilities to be covered under the law.40 Giving the example of war
veterans who use prosthetics,41 he believed there was no way Congress
intended this group of individuals to be denied coverage under the
Act, but whom, using the Sutton standard, would not be covered because of mitigating measures.42 Justice Stevens points out that just because people are taking advantage of a mitigating measure does not
mean that they are cured of their illnesses or disorders, or that they
will never be discriminated against on the basis of their disabilities.43
The dissent also points out that it makes no sense to allow someone
who has a record of a past disability to be covered, but not someone
with a current disability that is being mitigated.44 In fact, the Senate
and House reports regarding the original passage of the ADA made
clear that mitigating measures were not to be considered, with the Senate stating that “whether a person has a disability should be assessed
without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.”45
The Court affirmed its decision in Sutton with its decisions in Murphy v. United Postal Service Inc.46 and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.47 In
Murphy, the Supreme Court decided that an individual with high blood
pressure should not be considered disabled under the ADA because
Id. at 483-84.
Id. at 484; 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990).
38
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 472.
39
Id. at 495-98.
40
Id. at 495.
41
Id. at 497-98.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 499.
45
Id. at 499-500 (analyzing S. Rep. No. 101-116, p. 23 (1989) and H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. III, p.
28 (1990)).
46
527 U.S. 516 (1999).
47
527 U.S. 555 (1999).
36
37
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his condition was mitigated with medications, allowing him to function normally.48 Additionally, in Kirkingburg, the Court examined the
case of a truck driver with amblyopia, a form of monocular vision.49 In
that case, the individual was fired for failing to meet the Department of
Transportation’s (DOT) vision standards despite having no difficulty
performing the duties of the job.50 Notwithstanding his clear disability, Kirkingburg’s “brain has developed subconscious mechanisms for
coping with his visual impairment and thus his body compensates for
his disability.”51 The Court determined that the subconscious corrections that his mind had been making for years were indeed a mitigating measure, and he should be considered in his mitigated, and therefore compensated state, even though the mitigation was unconscious.52
Therefore, with what is commonly considered the “Sutton Trilogy,”
these three cases, all decided by the Supreme Court on the same day,
combined to create a regime whereby an individual who mitigated his or
her disability, whether consciously or unconsciously, generally became
less likely to qualify as an individual with a disability under the ADA.
The Supreme Court further narrowed the scope of the ADA with
its decision in 2002 of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams.53 In Toyota, an employee with carpal tunnel syndrome sued
Toyota for failure to accommodate her disability.54 The Court held that
Williams was not sufficiently disabled because she failed to meet the
“substantially limited” standard of the definition.55 With this decision,
the Court dictated that the term “substantially limits” should mean
that to be considered disabled under the ADA, the “individual must
have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual
from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s
daily lives.”56
The EEOC provided regulations as to what should be considered
substantially limiting.57 Under the EEOC Regulations, in addition to
determining that the ability to perform or take part in a major life activity
had to be significantly restricted,58 the EEOC also provided other factors
See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 525 (finding that because Murphy could not show that he could not
perform a class of jobs, he could not be disabled as a matter of law).
49
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 559.
50
See id. at 560 (explaining a DOT waiver program where individuals with deficient vision
could receive DOT certification after three years of commercial driving experience without having an accident or getting their licenses suspended).
51
See id. at 565 (quoting Kirkingburg v. Albertson’s, Inc., 143 F.3d, 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1998)).
52
See id. at 565-66 (noting that one’s body’s adjustment to a disability is no different than using
an artificial aid).
53
See 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
54
Id. at 184.
55
Id. at 184-85.
56
Id. at 185.
57
29 C.F.R 1630.2(j)(2)(iii) (1991).
58
Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
48
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for making the substantially limited determination.59 The factors provided by the EEOC suggest that courts examine “(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.”60
In light of the Supreme Court narrowing the scope of the ADA,
which was intended to eliminate discrimination against individuals
with disabilities, Congress felt it necessary to respond because the intent of its groundbreaking legislation from 1990 was apparently being
misunderstood. In response, Representative Steny Hoyer (D-MD) and
Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) introduced versions of the ADAAA in their
respective Houses of Congress.61
In the findings of the ADAAA, Congress plainly states that the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the ADA in recent years have narrowed the scope of the law such that individuals Congress clearly intended to be fully covered were no longer afforded adequate coverage
under the law.62 With the new legislation, Congress attempted to right
the wrongs of the Supreme Court and ensure that all Americans with
disabilities receive adequate coverage under federal law.
The ADAAA has a number of significant changes that will help all
Americans with disabilities have more consistent coverage under the
law. These changes will especially help increase coverage for individuals with mental illnesses. One of the most significant changes under
the ADAAA is the rejection of the mitigating measures standard set
forth in Sutton.63 The new law requires that any determination about
whether a person should be considered disabled under the law generally should be made without regard to mitigating measures.64 Mitigating measures are especially relevant for individuals with mental illnesses. According to the National Institute of Mental Health, in 2008,
58.7 percent of adults with mental illnesses received some type of treatment, either medication, therapy, or both.65 This number increases to
71 percent among adults diagnosed with some form of depression, and
is even higher among women with mental illnesses.66 These statistics
show that a huge percentage of individuals with mental illnesses are
Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii).
Id.
61
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted) (introduced by Senator
Tom Harkin); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2008) (introduced by
Representative Steny Hoyer).
62
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
63
See id. at § 2(b)(2).
64
Id. at § 343(4)(E)(i).
65
Use of Mental Health Services and Treatment Among Adults, Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health (Oct.
26, 2009, 3:02 PM), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/3USE_MT_ADULT.shtml (indicating that
outpatient services and prescription medication are the most frequently used treatments).
66
See id. (“Generally, women and adults over 50 were more likely than men and younger adults
to use services for depression.”).
59
60
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taking measures to mitigate their diseases. After Sutton, an enormous
number of people with legitimate disabilities, especially those with
mental health disorders, were no longer covered under the ADA solely because of the measures they were taking to control their illnesses.
Therefore, the elimination of the mitigating measures rule is incredibly
important for individuals with mental illnesses.
In addition, cases brought under the ADA generally required an
extensive determination as to whether the individual was actually
disabled instead of the determination focusing on whether the person
was discriminated against on the basis of the claimed disability.67 The
ADAAA directs the lower courts to end the extensive determination
process previously required to determine whether the person is disabled.68 The courts are instead instructed to focus on what the ADAAA
is actually intended to do: prevent discrimination against people with
disabilities.69
There are other significant changes in the ADAAA. While the
ADAAA keeps the same definition of disability that existed under the
ADA,70 the new law does something that the ADA did not do. It provides examples of what would qualify as a major life activity.71 In addition to other things, the list includes activities such as “caring for oneself, . . . learning, . . . concentrating, thinking, [and] communicating.”72
These are all activities that could have a positive impact on the ability of people with mental illnesses to more successfully bring claims
under the ADAAA given that they are activities that are often significantly limited by mental illnesses.73 In addition to the list provided by
Congress in the statute, the EEOC Regulations include an even more
comprehensive, although not exhaustive, list of what might be considered major life activities.74 Besides including the activities listed by
Congress, this list also includes the major life activity of “interacting
See Michelle Parikh, Note, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and There is Nothing Left for Proof:
The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to Persons with Mental Illness, 89 Cornell L. Rev.
721, 745-51 (2004) (providing a survey of ADA cases in several circuits where the focus was on
the plaintiff’s disability rather than the discrimination).
68
See Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (clarifying that courts should not extensively analyze individuals’ impairments to decide if they are disabilities).
69
See id. (instructing lower courts to focus on whether the challenged entity has complied with
the ADA, rather than the individuals’ capabilities).
70
Compare id. § 3(1), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (using identical language to define “disability”).
71
See Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3(2), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
72
Id.
73
But see Paul R. Klein, Note, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: The Pendulum Swings Back, 60
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 467, 470 (2010) (arguing that the inclusion of these terms might create more
problems because they sweep too broadly and are too difficult to define as they cannot be seen).
74
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i) (2011) (listing major life activities to include, but not be limited
to: “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking,
standing, siting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating,
thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working…” ).
67

Legislation & Policy Brief

15

with others,” 75 something that is of vital importance to most people in
their everyday lives, but something that many individuals with mental
illnesses struggle to do on a daily basis.
In addition to providing examples of what constitutes a major life
activity, the ADAAA also expands the definition of major life activity
to include not just activities, but also “major bodily functions.”76 Listed
among the enumerated major bodily functions are neurological and
brain functions.77 These categories could be of vital importance to the
likelihood of success in court for individuals with mental illnesses.78
Another change under the ADAAA is that Congress specified that
if a person has a disability that is not currently active, he or she should
still be considered disabled if the disability would substantially limit a
major life activity when active.79 Additionally, although the ADAAA
does clearly overturn the “severely restricts” language from Toyota,80 it
does not define what is meant by the term “substantially limits.” The
EEOC Final Regulations do provide some guidance, but they also do
not truly define “substantially limits.” During Senate debates on the
bill, there was some talk about changing the wording to further define
what was meant by substantially limits.81 The most likely alternative
was to change “substantially limits” to “materially restricts.”82 This
language was defeated in the Senate because of concerns that the “materially restricts” language was ambiguous and would provide no better guidance to the courts than what had already been provided.83 The
EEOC, in its regulations, provides more information about what “substantially limits” does not mean than what it does mean.84 In an attempt
to ensure the courts understand that Congress did not intend them to
follow the EEOC’s former guidance of “significantly restricted” or the
Toyota language of “severely restricts,” the EEOC Final Regulation provides that
[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning of
this section if it ‘substantially limits’ the ability of an inId.
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3(2)(B), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
77
Id.
78
But see Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Enfeebling the ADA: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 62 Okla.
L. Rev. 667 (2010) (arguing that the expansion of major life activities and the addition of bodily
functions actually brings the ADAAA out of the realm of what was intended by the ADA
because it is too expansive, is now allowing side effects to essentially make someone eligible for
coverage, and confuses the goal of positive outcomes with the disability definition itself).
79
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3(4)(D), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
80
Id. § 1630.2(b)(5).
81
Wendy F. Hensel, Rights Resurgence: The Impact of the ADA Amendments Act on Schools and
Universities, 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 641, 653 (2009).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2011) (elaborating on the intent of “substantial meaning”).
75
76
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dividual to perform a major life activity as compared to
most people in the general population. An impairment
need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict,
the individual from performing a major life activity in
order to be considered substantially limiting.85

Additionally, the EEOC discusses that the threshold for reaching the
disability definition is lower than it was under the ADA, and therefore
the definition of “substantially limits” is less crucial to the determination.86 The EEOC clearly states that “[t]he question of whether an
individual meets the definition of disability . . . should not demand
extensive analysis.”87
II. Individuals with Mental Illnesses Should be More
Successful Under the ADAAA Than They Were Under the ADA
A. Coverage Under the ADA for Individuals with
Mental Illness
Under the ADA, individuals with mental illnesses were generally
unsuccessful in making claims of discrimination against their employers.88 In 2009, not a single employee who brought suit under the ADA
for discrimination in the workplace on the basis of his or her mental
illness was successful in the claim.89 While employees with mental
illnesses fared better in previous years, there were still an extremely
small number of successful employees with mental illness claims under the ADA.90 From the inception of the ADA, there were a number of
concerns that people with mental illnesses would not be afforded full
protection under the law. The major concerns were that:
(1) the legislative history, early commentaries, and
practice manuals relating to the ADA scarcely acknowledged the application of the Act to persons with mental
disabilities; (2) when commentators have considered
the Act’s application to persons with mental disabilities,
the analysis has generally been limited to persons with
Id.
Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii)-(iv); see also Bonnie M. Wheaton, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Who is
Disabled?, 23 Dupage Cnty. Bar Ass’n Brief 22 (2010) (explaining that while the threshold to be
considered disabled is lower under the ADAAA, it is still a determination that needs to be made,
based on facts, by the courts).
87
29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2011).
88
See Amy L. Allbright, 2009 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I – Survey Update, 34
Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 339, 341 (2010) (explaining that employers generally win
on summary judgment or dismissals).
89
See id. (describing the drop in employee wins from 2008, when more employees prevailed).
90
Id.
85
86
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mental retardation, rather than those with mental illness;
and (3) no matter how strongly such an Act is worded,
the law’s aims cannot be met unless there is a corresponding change in public attitudes (especially among the legal
system interpreting and enforcing the Act).91
When the House of Representatives wrote its report on the proposed legislation, it stated that discrimination against individuals with
disabilities “often results from false presumptions, generalizations,
misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and
pernicious mythologies.”92 This belief is often referred to as discrimination resulting from myths, fears and stereotypes. Since 1997, claims
to the EEOC based on a violation of the ADA as a result of the
employee’s mental illness have increased significantly, especially in the
areas of manic-depressive disorder, depression, and schizophrenia,93
and many of these claims were likely based on some type of myth, fear
or stereotype.
Under the ADA, individuals with mental illnesses had a particularly hard time showing that they were both qualified to do the job
and significantly disabled enough to qualify for protection against
discrimination under the ADA. It was particularly hard for such individuals to prove this because the effects of their disabilities often
resulted in courts determining that they were not actually qualified
to do to the job in question.94 This is because some of the most common outward manifestations of mental illnesses in the work place are
attendance problems, often resulting from side effects of the individual’s medications, and problems with concentration and misconduct,
which often result from an inability to fully deal with the stresses of
the workplace.95 When individuals are having problems such as these
at work, especially in terms of missing a lot of days or being habitually
tardy, courts often determine that they are no longer qualified to do the
job, and therefore further inquiry into the case is unnecessary.96
Jennifer M. Jackson, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Mental Illness, and
Medication: A Historical Perspective and Hope for the Future, 12 Marq. Elder’s Advisor 219, 224
(2010).
92
H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 24, at 30 (1990).
93
See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, ADA Charge Data by Impairments/
Bases - Receipts.
FY 1997-FY 2010, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-receipts.cfm
(showing that the rates for impairment for persons with manic depressive disorder rose from
1.9% in 1997 to 4.3% in 2008).
94
See Randal I. Goldstein, Note, Mental Illness in the Workplace after Sutton v. United Air Lines,
86 Cornell L. Rev. 927, 945 (2001) (describing the requirement to prove disabled status and
qualification for the position as a catch-22).
95
Id.
96
See Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F. 3d. 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that an employee with depression who missed a significant amount of work was not qualified for the job because she would have to be present in the workplace to perform the essential
91
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Another significant problem facing individuals with mental illnesses is that their employers often do not know they are disabled, as mental illnesses are generally not known to others unless the individual
reveals his or her condition.97 Under the ADA, an employer is only held
accountable for discrimination on the basis of disability if the employer
is aware that the disability exists.98 There are a multitude of cases, spanning from the inception of the ADA through the present, where the
plaintiff was denied relief for the alleged discrimination because the
employer was unaware of the condition.99
One part of the reason why individuals with mental illnesses might
have had trouble claiming disability status under the ADA stems from
the EEOC Guidance and Regulations in regards to the mental illnesses.100 The EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities states that “traits or behaviors
are not, in themselves, mental impairments.”101 While the EEOC seems
to be making the point that it requires more than just the traits or behaviors of an illness to be actually considered disabled, the traits or behaviors that characterize the illness are often what the person is being
discriminated against for. The EEOC makes a valid point, that odd behaviors alone are not enough for coverage. However, it may have given
some employers the idea that discriminating against an employee on
the basis of his or her traits or behaviors, especially if the employer
is not certain that the employee has a mental illness, is an acceptable
practice. In turn, it is possible that courts may get the impression, based
on the EEOC Guidance, that it is allowable for an employer to discriminate against an employee with a mental illness because the fact that the
employee is exhibiting unusual behaviors or has unusual traits is not
a disability.
However, the EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities was not entirely negative
for individuals with mental illnesses. The EEOC created the guidance
functions of her job); see also Grubb v. Southwest Air Lines, 296 F. App’x 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1986 (2009).
97
See generally Rogers v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 1328 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (determining
that without the employee telling the employer about a mental illness, there was no way for the
employer to know).
98
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
99
See Kobus v. College of St. Scholastica, Inc., 2009 WL 294370, at *7 (D. Minn. 2009); see also
Fussell v. Georgia Ports Authority, 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1569 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
100
See Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness, Employment Discrimination, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 79, 103 (2006) (describing how the
EEOC guidance specifically notes that traits or behaviors are not, in themselves, mental impairments although they may be linked).
101
See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Enforcement Guidance on
the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (1997), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html.
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because it was receiving a high number of mental health claims.102 It
wanted to clarify how the law works and improve protection for those
individuals.103 The guidance helped to highlight, for both employers
and employees, the parts of the ADA and related regulations relevant
to individuals with mental illnesses. The guidance explains that mitigating measures should not be considered,104 chronic and episodic
disorders are covered,105 and major life activities includes interacting
with others and concentrating.106 The guidance also provides direction
about disclosing mental illnesses107 and how to request accommodations.108 Despite some flaws, this guidance overall is an invaluable tool
for individuals with mental illnesses and their employers.
Individuals with mental illnesses had a major problem with the
EEOC Guidance and Regulations because of the lack of official inclusion of mental illness related major life activities, such as concentrating
and interacting with others. In fact, there were instances where individuals with mental illnesses attempted to bring suit under the ADA
claiming that they were disabled because they were substantially limited in these major life activities. These claims, however, were rejected
by the courts because they were not viewed as rising to the level of a
major life activity that was substantially limited.109 In the case of Soileau
v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., the First Circuit felt that if the EEOC intended
interacting with others to be considered a major life activity, then it
would have included it in its Regulations or Guidance.110 In addition,
the Court felt that no workable definition of interacting with others
could exist because it was too different from things like walking and
breathing, which were specifically mentioned by the EEOC.111 In Pack
v. Kmart Corp., the Tenth Circuit determined that “[c]oncentration may
be a significant and necessary component of a major life activity, such
as working, learning, or speaking, but it is not an ‘activity’ itself,” and
therefore it cannot qualify as a major life activity that is substantially
See id. (explaining that the EEOC “receives a large number of charges under the ADA alleging employment discrimination based on psychiatric disability”).
103
See id. (“This guidance is designed to: facilitate the full enforcement of the ADA with respect
to individuals alleging employment discrimination based on psychiatric disability; respond
to questions and concerns expressed by individuals with psychiatric disabilities regarding the
ADA; and answer questions posed by employers about how principles of ADA analysis apply in
the context of psychiatric disabilities.”).
104
Id. at no. 6. This guidance was written pre-Sutton.
105
Id. at no. 8.
106
Id. at no. 9-10.
107
Id. at no. 14 (explaining the circumstances when an employer can ask for disability-related
information).
108
Id. at no. 17-29.
109
See Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Soileau v. Guilford of Maine,
Inc., 105 F. 3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997).
110
105 F.3d at 15 (stating that interacting with others is not listed as an ability in the EEOC
regulations).
111
Id.
102
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limited in terms of qualifying an individual for protection under the
ADA.112 However, some plaintiffs have successfully made claims that
interacting with others is a major life activity. In McAlindin v. County of
San Diego, the Ninth Circuit held that anindividual with anxiety, panic
and somatoform disorders was disabled under the ADA, in part because he was substantially limited in the major life activity of interacting with others.113 The court determined that interacting with others
qualified as a major life activity because it “is an essential, regular function, like walking and breathing, [so it] easily falls within the definition
of ‘major life activity.’”114
A significant problem after the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton
was the effect that using medication would have on the likelihood of a
person succeeding in an ADA claim based on a medicated psychiatric
disorder.115 In Sutton, the Supreme Court declared that should an individual use any means to mitigate his or her illness, his or her claim of
being disabled needs to be determined in that mitigated state.116 In the
case of Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, the Eighth Circuit determined that
a police officer with depression was not disabled because his medication allowed him to function normally, even though without mitigating measures he attempted suicide.117 It did not appear that the Sutton
Court was encouraging plaintiffs who generally mitigated their conditions to stop correcting those conditions just to have the ability to
sue under the ADA.118 There was, however, a fear after the Sutton decision that people who were dutiful in strictly mitigating their illnesses
would be less likely to succeed than someone with the same disorder of
similar severity who was less strict about his or her mitigation.119 There
was also a fear that individuals who had the money or insurance for
adequate mitigation measures would be disadvantaged under the statute as compared with individuals who did not have the means to mitigate, and therefore could only be viewed in their unmitigated states.120
Especially after the decision in Sutton, individuals with disabilities
that could be mitigated, especially those with mental illnesses, began
offering an alternative theory to their disability claims, that their medi166 F.3d at 1305.
McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1999).
114
Id. at 1234.
115
See Jackson, supra note 91, at 220 (2010) (commenting on the division between the lower
courts after the Sutton decision on how to address the issue of mitigating measures, such as
medications used to ameliorate the illness).
116
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999).
117
See Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897, 899-900 (8th Cir. 1999).
118
See Jackson, supra note 92, at 231-32 (explaining that the Court in Sutton did not want to
encourage future plaintiffs from not mitigating their disabilities in order to meet the statutory
definition of disability).
119
Goldstein, supra note 94, at 953 (2001).
120
Id.
112
113
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cations were the cause of their disabilities.121 For example, in Collins
v. Prudential Investment & Retirement Services, the plaintiff claimed her
medication for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) was
causing a sleep disorder, causing her to need additional medication.122
The court determined that the mitigating measure of taking medications corrected the impairment, so she was not disabled under the
law.123 In the Sutton decision, the Supreme Court pointed out a few
mitigating measures that have negative side effects for the individuals
using them.124 The mitigating measures listed by the Supreme Court
were antipsychotic drugs, drugs used to treat Parkinson’s disease, and
antiepileptic drugs.125 Additionally, the Court noted that given its interpretation of the ADA leading to the decision on mitigating measures,
for courts to determine whether a person qualified as “substantially
limited” as part of the disability definition, side effects of the mitigating
measures, whether good or bad, would have to be considered.126
Plaintiffs did bring claims prior to Sutton that they were disabled
due to the side effects of their medications, but the number of those
claims increased after the Supreme Court’s decision.127 Some Circuit
Courts established a test beyond the normal ADA disability claim to
determine whether side effects of a medication could be considered
disabling under the law.128 This test requires the plaintiff to show that
“(1) the treatment is required in the prudent judgment of the medical
profession, (2) the treatment is not just an attractive option, and (3) that
the treatment is not required solely in anticipation of an impairment
resulting from the plaintiff’s voluntary choices.”129 Once a plaintiff
prevails on the above test, courts generally treat the side effects of the
medication the same as they would any other disability.130 If the side
effects of medication taken to ameliorate the effects of a disability are
themselves disabling, courts have determined that a plaintiff can preSee id at 953-54.
See Collins v. Prudential Inv. & Ret. Serv., 119 F. App’x 371, 378-79 (3d Cir. 2005) (describing
the Plaintiff’s need to take Ambien to counteract the effects of Adderol).
123
See id. (stating that the test of mitigating measures is not whether the mitigating measure
cures the disability).
124
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999) (noting medications that cause
severe side effects).
125
See id. (citing reports of side effects of various drugs).
126
See id. at 482 (rejecting the interpretation that people must be evaluated in their uncorrected
state).
127
Cf. Jackson, supra note 91, at 232-33 (2010) (explaining that courts considered the disabling
effects of medications before Sutton in determining coverage under the ADA).
128
See Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Christian v.
St. Anthony Medical Center, Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1052 (7th Cir. 1997).
129
See Sulima, 602 F.3d at 186.
130
Christian v. St. Anthony Medical Center, Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1052; see Lauren J. McGarity,
Note, Disabling Corrections and Correctable Disabilities: Why Side Effects Might be the Saving Grace of
Sutton, 109 Yale L.J. 1161, 1182 (2000).
121
122

22

The Americans with Disabilties Act

vail on his or her disability claim.131
However, not mitigating an illness or condition that could be mitigated could, on its own, disqualify a plaintiff from coverage under the
ADA. Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights132 is the first case where a
non-mitigating plaintiff was found to have no claim because of a failure
to mitigate.133 In this case, the plaintiff was fired from his job as a police
officer after having a hypoglycemic reaction as a result of uncontrolled
diabetes.134 He was ultimately fired due to the effect on his body caused
by not medicating his diabetes.135 The court determined that his failure
to medicate his condition made him unqualified to continue to work
as a police officer.136 Other courts have interpreted the Siefken decision
to stand for the proposition “that a plaintiff cannot recover under the
ADA if through plaintiff’s own fault plaintiff fails to control an otherwise controllable illness.”137
After Sutton, the calculus changed for individuals with disabilities
in terms of mitigation of their illnesses or disabilities. Theoretically, after the Supreme Court’s decisions in 1999, a person was to be viewed in
his or her current state, irrespective of whether that state was mitigated
or unmitigated.138 The Supreme Court, in its justification for requiring
plaintiffs to be viewed in their mitigated states, proclaimed that to do
otherwise would require speculation about what an individual would
hypothetically be like in another state.139 The Court believed that if the
rule were to look at a plaintiff in a hypothetical state, Congress’s desire
for an individualized inquiry for each plaintiff would not be met since
the individual claiming a disability would theoretically have to be
looked at the same as any other individual with that disability.140 The
same justification, however, also works to ensure that individuals who
choose not to mitigate their disabilities would need to be examined in
their current, and therefore unmitigated, states. If the courts were to
view individuals with unmitigated disabilities in any light other than
the way they currently are, they would be going against the Court’s
holding in Sutton.
In his dissent in Sutton, Justice Stevens makes the point that it is not
See Jamison v. Dow Chem. Co., 354 F. Supp. 2d 715, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citing Sutton, 527
U.S. at 484).
132
65 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 1995).
133
See id. at 667 (finding that the employer did not have to create reasonable accommodations if
the employee could not control his disability). See also Jackson, supra note 92 at 234-35 (discussing the circumstances of Siefken).
134
Siefken, 65 F.3d at 665-66.
135
Id. at 666.
136
Id. at 667.
137
See Paine ex rel. Eilman v. Johnson, 2010 WL 785397, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2010) (citing
Nunn v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 448 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (C.D. Ill. 2006)).
138
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 472 (1999).
139
Id.
140
Id.
131
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the consideration of mitigating measures that results in people with
similar disabilities being grouped together unnecessarily, it is instead
the majority’s decision in Sutton that does that.141 Justice Stevens reasons that by not allowing mitigating measures to be considered, the
Court is actually condoning employers having blanket policies stating
that individuals with certain disabilities are incapable of doing the job,
when in fact, with reasonable accommodations, there are most likely
some disabled individuals who would be able to perform the essential
functions and adequately do the job.142
Unfortunately, even after Sutton, courts continued to deny coverage
to individuals that chose to not mitigate their disabilities, even though
this was contrary to the holding from Sutton.143 In the case of Nunn v.
Illinois State Board of Education, the plaintiff, an employee suffering from
bipolar disorder, was denied coverage under the ADA.144 This denial,
theoretically, was because she did not mitigate her disease given that
she did not or could not acknowledge that she actually had bipolar disorder.145 Coverage under the ADA was denied in large part because, in
her unmitigated state, the plaintiff was not otherwise qualified for her
job.146 However, the plaintiff was also denied coverage because she did
not mitigate her condition.147 The court cited the decision from Siefken,
that a plaintiff who chooses not to mitigate a condition that can be mitigated cannot be covered under the ADA.148 Because the court believed
that bipolar disorder could be mitigated, the plaintiff was barred from
further consideration under the ADA.149 Although the Nunn decision
was seven years after Sutton, there is no mention of either the Sutton decision or the rule implied in that case, that individuals cannot be denied
coverage under the ADA simply because they choose not to mitigate
their conditions; they need to be viewed in their current states.150 Although the plaintiff in Nunn still likely would have been denied coverage since she, in her unmitigated state, was not qualified for her job, the
case ignores Sutton but adheres to Siefken.

Id. at 509-510.
Id.
143
Jackson, supra note 91, at 237-38 (2010) (detailing cases that applied Sutton and Siefken to
deny ADA coverage to nonmitigating plaintiffs).
144
448 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 1001-02.
148
Id. (citing Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir.1995)).
149
Id.
150
Id.; see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 472 (1999).
141
142
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B. Coverage for Individuals with Mental Illness
Post-ADAAA Passage

When the ADAAA was passed in 2008, members of the disability
communities had high hopes that it would help individuals with disabilities, especially those with mental illnesses, diabetes, and epilepsy,
disorders which, under the old regime, were often excluded from coverage.151 Additionally, plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs were excited at
the possibility of having their litigation move forward, instead of being decided at the summary judgment stage for the employer, as so
many cases were under the ADA.152 In 2009, there were no employees
with mental illnesses who were successful in their ADA claims against
an employer.153 When looking at ADA claims cumulatively, for all disabilities, plaintiffs were only successful 2.6 percent of the time in 2009,
accounting for just nine out of 454 cases.154 Many of these cases were
decided for the employer at the summary judgment stage because although the employee claimed to have some type of disability, due to
the narrowing of the definition of disability by the Supreme Court in
the “Sutton Trilogy” and Toyota, the individual had trouble establishing
either that he or she was otherwise qualified for the job or that his or
her disability substantially limited a major life activity.155
However, the high hopes for the future in disability discrimination
claims have not yet come to light. This is not to say that the ADAAA
will not sufficiently do what it intended—broaden the coverage of the
legislation to fully cover all qualified individuals.156 Many people are
predicting that all plaintiffs may not be successful, but there will be
more disability discrimination claims under the new law, and overall more plaintiffs will be successful in their cases.157 There are many
plaintiffs who had pending cases at the time of the ADAAA’s passage,
or who have brought claims subsequent to the passage. The ADAAA
See Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining “Disability” Discrimination: A Proposal to
Restore Civil Rights Protections for all Workers, 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 321, 321-22 (2003) (noting
that people suffering from epilepsy, diabetes, and psychiatric conditions who are able to control
their conditions with medication routinely had their ADA cases dismissed as outside of the
protection of the statute).
152
See generally Allbright, supra note 88.
153
See id. at 341 (recounting survey results that indicating that no employee won in cases of
mental illness or substance abuse).
154
Id. at 339 (the least employee wins in the survey’s history).
155
Danielle J. Ravencraft, Note, Why the “New ADA” Requires an Individualized Inquiry as to What
Qualifies as a “Major Life Activity, 37 N. Ky. L. Rev. 441, 442-45 (2010).
156
See Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2, 3, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (listing the findings and purpose of the
ADA Amendments of 2008).
157
See Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1483, 1495-1500 (2011). See also Wendy F. Hensel, Rights Resurgence: The
Impact of the ADA Amendments Act on Schools and Universities, 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 641, 667-68
(2009) (discussing the likelihood of increased litigation due to the ADAAA and the potential for
better outcomes for plaintiffs).
151
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became effective on January 1, 2009.158 However, there is no published
case law to date dealing with mental illness in which the plaintiff’s
cause of action and damages sought originate after the effective date
of the bill.159 In all of the cases where a plaintiff with a mental illness
is seeking damages for a past action of his or her employer, the courts
have determined that the amendments do not apply retroactively, and
therefore the courts are bound by the ADA and case law surrounding
that statute, not the ADAAA.160 The courts that have already faced this
issue determined that “Congress did not state in the ADAAA or indicate in the legislative history whether the amendments should govern
cases arising before January 1, 2009.”161 One such court determined that
a plaintiff cannot be judged under the standards of the ADAAA because the new legislation created new legal standards and broadened
the scope of the law.162
Courts have stated that, dating back to cases surrounding the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, when amendments to legislation create a substantial
change to the structure of the statute, the new legislation cannot apply
to cases currently pending.163 The Court says, “a statute does not operate
retrospectively merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment or upsets expectations based in
prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches
new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.”164
There has been one case that has applied the ADAAA to pending
legislation.165 In Jenkins v. National Board of Medical Examiners, the plaintiff was a medical student seeking extra time on the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) based on his diagnosed reading
disorder.166 Jenkins was awarded extra time for other standardized
tests, such as the ACT and MCAT, but was denied the extra time for
the USMLE.167 The District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
denied Jenkins any relief based on its belief that, under the Toyota
standard, he failed to identify major life activities in which he was subSee Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (listing the effective date of the ADAAA as
January 1, 2009).
159
See, e.g., Durham v. McDonald’s Rests. of Okla., 325 F. App’x 694 (10th Cir. 2009) (footnote 2);
Pinegar v. Shinseki, 2010 WL 891700, at *1 (M.D. Penn. Mar. 10, 2010); Geiger v. Pfizer, Inc., 2009
WL 983545, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2009); Schmitz v. Louisiana, 2009 WL 210497, at *2 (M.D. La.
Jan. 27, 2009) (the ADA Amendments do not apply retroactively).
160
See, e.g., Durham, 325 F. App’x at 695; Pinegar, 2010 WL 891700, at *1; Geiger, 2009 WL 983545,
at *2; Schmitz, 2009 WL 210497, at *1-2 (ADA Amendments are not retroactive).
161
Schmitz, 2009 WL 210497, at *2.
162
Id. at *2-3.
163
See Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 2009 WL 331638, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009).
164
Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994)).
165
Id.
166
See id. at *1 (giving the factual background of the case).
167
See id. (noting that Jenkin’s request for additional time was denied by the National Board of
Medical Examiners after several levels of review).
158
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stantially limited.168 Jenkins claimed that he was substantially limited
in the major life activity of reading.169 The District Court had decided
that, under Toyota, which was good law at the time of its decision, Jenkins was not limited enough compared to the general population in
his ability to read even though it was evident he read slower and with
more difficulty than most.170
The Sixth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded.171 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that “because this case involves prospective relief and was pending when the amendments became effective, the ADA must be applied as amended.”172 The plaintiff
wanted extra time to take a test, something that would happen after the
effective date of the ADAAA.173 Additionally, because he was not asking for past damages, he was not asking the court to hold the National
Board of Medical Examiners liable for anything that happened before
the amendments were passed.174 With this decision, the court made it
clear that although the ADAAA cannot apply retroactively for cases
seeking damages for incidents of discrimination that occurred before
the effective date of the legislation, if someone had legislation pending
when the ADAAA went into effect, and the individual is only seeking
injunctive relief, the plaintiff’s case should be entitled to consideration
under the new legislation. If the lower court had based its decision on
the new law (which did not exist at the time of its decision), it may not
have come to the same conclusion that it did, given that the ADAAA
provides a much broader scope as to what qualifies as a disability
because of a substantial limitation in a major life activity.175 The Sixth
Circuit did however make clear that it is a remand, and that the plaintiff
is not guaranteed a victory.176 The court also makes clear that even if the
lower court, on remand, does find that the plaintiff is disabled under the
ADAAA, he is not automatically guaranteed the remedy that he is seeking. Instead, the decision will be a determination for the court to make, as
to what the National Board of Medical Examiners should be required to
See id. (citing Jenkins, 2008 WL 410237, at *2-3 (finding that Jenkins could not demonstrate
that his reading difficulties prevented him from performing daily tasks)).
169
See Jenkins, 2008 WL 410237, at *2 (stating that Jenkins would have trouble reading street
signs quickly, read aloud in church, or watch movies with subtitles).
170
See Jenkins, 2009 WL 331638, at *1 (quoting the district court’s decision in Jenkins, 2008 WL
410237, at *2).
171
See id. at *4 (remanding the case for redetermination in accordance with the ADAAA).
172
Id. at *1.
173
See id. (noting that Jenkins was not looking for relief for past discrimination, but extra time
on a test administered after the ADAAA became effective).
174
See id. (distinguishing the case from those that seek damages for past discrimination under
the ADAAA).
175
See id. at *2-3 (“The change in the law has therefore undermined the district court’s holding .
. . .”).
176
See id. at *4 (remanding the case for further findings, rather than a directed verdict).
168
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do to accommodate an individual with a reading impairment.177
There has been no actual case law applying the ADAAA to cases
seeking damages, the type of cases that makes up a significant majority of ADA cases. Therefore, it is only possible to anticipate, based on
the language of the statute, the legislative history of the amendments,
and the new EEOC Final Regulations, how individuals with disabilities, and particularly individuals with mental illnesses will fare under
the ADAAA.
The most significant change for all individuals with disabilities, but
specifically for individuals with mental illnesses, under the ADAAA, is
that courts are now instructed to put more focus on the discrimination
that the person has possibly been subjected to rather than the determination of whether or not the person is disabled under the law.178 This
is a momentous change from the ADA, where a considerable number
of cases were decided on summary judgment for the employer because
the plaintiff could not adequately prove he or she was qualified as a
disabled individual under the law.179
The EEOC, in its Final Regulations, acknowledges that the new version of the law should help people with a number of ailments, and
among those listed are people with mental illnesses.180 This is in part
because, in terms of reasonable accommodations for mental illnesses,
the costs are generally low to non-existent, with many employees simply asking for schedule changes, slight modifications to their job functions, or minimal time off for treatment.181 Additionally, with the inclusion of “interacting with others” to the EEOC’s list of activities that, if
affected by a disability, constitute a major life activity, many people
with mental illnesses of all types will be more likely to qualify as disabled under the ADAAA. This is because with many mental illnesses,
the individuals, for various reasons, have trouble interacting with others, something that most people take for granted in their daily lives.
However, it is something that, under the old law, a court could easily
have determined was not “significant” or “severe” enough to constitute coverage for the individual under the law. The EEOC also points
out that while there should not be per se disabilities, there are some
that should predictably win out on the question of whether or not the
See id. at *4 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12189).
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
179
See generally Evans v. Consumer Info. Dispute Resolution, 223 F. App’x 46 (2d Cir. 2007);
Johnson v. Maynard, 2003 WL 548754, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2003) (holding that just having
a disorder such as bipolar disorder or schizophrenia is not enough to qualify as an individual
with a disability); Schwartz v. Comex, 1997 WL 187353, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997) (finding
that a paranoid thought disorder, on its own, is not enough to qualify as an individual with a
disability).
180
76 FR 16987 (March 25, 2011).
181
Id.
177
178
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person with such illness or condition is actually disabled.182 The Commission points out that no disability can truly be per se since the law
still shows a desire for an individualized assessment, albeit a modified,
briefer assessment than existed in the past.183 The EEOC also enumerates a number of disorders, specifically listing why, on an almost per se
basis, they should be considered to limit major bodily functions, a category that was added to supplement the major life activities column.184
The list provided by the EEOC mentions that “major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compul
sive disorder, and schizophrenia substantially limit brain function.”185
By providing this list, the EEOC is attempting to ensure that individuals with a broad range of mental illnesses will have a greater chance of
full coverage under the ADAAA given that Congress decided not to
include interacting with others in its list of major life activities in the
new law.
Although Congress did not list interacting with others as a major
life activity in the final bill, the House of Representatives did acknowledge it as a possibility.186 The Education and Labor Committee, in its
Report, mentions in its explanation of major life activities that, among
other activities, “interacting with others” should be considered a major
life activity under the ADAAA.187 To illustrate its beliefs, the Committee discussed Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a case in which an individual with an intellectual disability tried to bring suit under the ADA
on the premise that his disability substantially limited him in the major
life activities of learning, thinking, communicating, social interaction,
and working.188 The Court expressed doubt about whether thinking,
communication, and social interactions could be considered major life
activities. 189 The Court ultimately determined it was irrelevant whether
those were major life activities because Littleton had not proven that he
was substantially limited in any of those activities.190 In the Education
and Labor Committee’s Report, the Committee mentions that under
the new law, Littleton should be able to “provide evidence of material
restriction in the major life activities of thinking, learning, communicating and interacting with others.”191 This acknowledges the possibilId. § 1630.2(j)(3).
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).
186
H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 11 (2008) (Report of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor) [hereafter
Educ. & Labor Rep.] (explaining that the statutory list is not finite and an example of a major life
activity include interacting with others).
187
Id.
188
Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 231 F.App’x 874, 875 (11th Cir. 2007).
189
Id. at 877.
190
Id. at 877-78.
191
Educ. & Labor Rep., supra note 186, at 10.
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ity of adding interacting with others to the list of major life activities,
but it was not ultimately added into the final version.
A huge victory for individuals with mental illnesses was the overturning of the decision in Sutton.192 As was explained above, under the
rule requiring courts to view an individual with a disability in his or
her mitigated state when determining whether he or she qualifies as
disabled under the legislation,193 many individuals with mental illnesses were no longer qualified under the ADA. This was due in part to the
therapies (medication, cognitive, behavioral, etc.) that the individual
used to mitigate his or her illness, leading the condition to be considered controlled, and therefore not substantially limiting any major life
activities. As a result, many people who legitimately should have been
covered by the ADA, and who Congress appears to have wanted covered under the ADA, were wrongfully denied coverage. Along with
Sutton being overturned, Congress specified that if a disability is “episodic or in remission[, it] is a disability if it would substantially limit a
major life activity when active.”194
With the removal of the Sutton precedent, and the addition of the
episodic provision, individuals with mental illnesses should have a
much easier time proving their disabilities. Some argue that removing
the Sutton precedent will allow individuals with minor impairments
that are fully mitigated by simple measures to have access to coverage
under the law when such individuals are not the actual intended recipients of the law’s reach.195 However, it appears as though Congress
is not intending for people to be excluded from coverage just because
some would consider their conditions minor.196 If the individual has a
condition that does in fact limit, in some way, a major life activity or a
major bodily function, Congress is intending the individual to be eligible for coverage under the law.197
The vast majority of individuals with mental illnesses use some
type of mitigating measure for such illnesses, as they often would
not be able to adequately function, and therefore would likely not be
qualified for the jobs they are seeking or were discriminated against
in, if they did not. Under the old regime, they faced the very realistic possibility that their attempts to normalize their lives and control
their illnesses would lead to them not being covered under a piece of
legislation that was intended to protect them.198 However, under the
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new regime, these individuals should be covered.199 Theoretically, the
courts should view the individual as he or she is without mitigation of
his or her mental illness.200 For many with a mental illness, as the EEOC
points out in its Final Regulations, without the consideration of medications and other mitigating measures, his or her illness is a disability
and he or she should be afforded coverage under the law.201
In addition, with the episodic and remission provision added, individuals with mental illnesses will have an even greater chance of getting the coverage under the ADAAA that Congress intended them to
have. Many, although certainly not all, mental illnesses, even if untreated, are somewhat episodic. Additionally, many of those same mental
illnesses can be considered to be essentially in remission with the use of
medications and the appropriate forms of therapy. However, even if a
person is not currently experiencing symptoms of his or her mental illness, the individual is still suffering from the disease because there are
no cures for mental illnesses. With the changes in the ADAAA, Congress is making it clear that it intends for these types of individuals to
be given full coverage under the law.
Individuals with mental illnesses are often the target of discrimination based not on their actual disabilities, but as a result of myths, fears
and stereotypes. Because of this false belief, individuals with real disabilities that are not actually very disabling could easily be “regarded
as” disabled, the third prong of the disability definition.202 It is unfortunate that there are a number of people, including many employers,
who have certain beliefs about what it means to have a mental illness.
There are an unfortunate number of people who, for whatever reason,
will reveal to an employer that they have a mental illness, and will then
be treated differently because of it. When the individual is discriminated against because of an actual mental illness, the discussion above
applies.
The change relating to the “regarded as” clause of the disability
definition has to do with reasonable accommodations.203 Under the
ADAAA, if a person is regarded as having a disability and is discriminated against, the person, under the new law, is not entitled to request a reasonable accommodation from his or her employer.204 In a
sense, this is the protection the law provides for employers given that
if they believe someone has a disability, and they regard the individual
But see Reagan S. Bissonnette, Note, Reasonably Accommodating Nonmitigating Plaintiffs after
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 859, 862 (2009) (arguing that it is likely that nonmitigating plaintiffs will have trouble making a case under the ADAAA because they will likely
be considered not otherwise qualified).
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as such, and subsequently discriminate against him or her based on
their mistaken beliefs, under this law they are not responsible for accommodating the individual for a disease or disorder that the person
does not actually have. Additionally, if a person has a disability, but the
employer regards them as being in a worse state due to the disability
than he or she actually is, the person still has the “actual disability” or
“record of disability” prongs to fall back on.205
This is especially important given the new version of the legislation. Previously, if a person was regarded as having a disability that
was worse than it actually was, especially if it was less severe due to
mitigation, he or she often encountered difficulties trying to prevail in
court. Now, however, if a person has a mental illness that is being mitigated so it is not as severe as his or her employer seems to believe it is,
the mitigating measures that lessen the severity of the disability cannot be taken into account.206 Given the new law, individuals that most
likely could not prevail in the past will have a much greater chance of
prevailing today.
One aspect of the ADA that did not significantly change with the
creation of the ADAAA is the overall requirement of reasonable accommodations. Under the law set forth in the ADA, an employer is generally required to accommodate an employee with a disability as long as
that person can be considered otherwise qualified to do the job.207 Under the ADA, and now under the ADAAA, the employer did not have
to accommodate the individual with a disability if the accommodation
would cause an undue hardship for the employer.208 Under the statute, an undue hardship is “an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense.”209 Whether an accommodation would be an undue hardship
for the employer is determined by examining the nature and cost of
the overall accommodation, the overall financial resources of the facility or covered entity, and the type of operation of the covered entity.210
Reasonable accommodations are generally among the least expensive
accommodations for individuals with mental illnesses, with employees
most commonly asking for things like schedule modifications, the ability to work from home, or slight modifications to non-essential functions of the job.211
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Conclusion

No one knows exactly what will transpire under the ADAAA. In
2008, when Congress passed sweeping amendments to the groundbreaking law from 1990, its intention was to undo decisions by the
Supreme Court that severely narrowed the scope of the ADA. In its
attempt to right the Supreme Court’s wrongs, Congress spelled out its
goal of effectively overturning the decisions in the “Sutton Trilogy” and
Toyota. In addition, and with the assistance of the EEOC Final Regulations, new rules are laid out for the courts to follow in the future litigation that unfortunately is bound to come.
Under the old law, individuals with mental illnesses were incredibly unsuccessful in challenging the unlawful actions of their employers when employers discriminated against them on the basis of disability. In most cases, the failure of the employees was not because the
discriminatory actions did not actually happen or could not be proven.
In most cases the litigation never reached the stage of determining fault
on the discrimination claim because, due to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability, including substantially
limiting and major life activities, most cases were decided on summary
judgment for the employer. This was because the plaintiff, the employee with a mental illness, was not able to adequately prove to the court
that he or she was actually disabled under the law.
Under the new legislation, plaintiffs with disabilities, and especially
those with mental illnesses should be much more successful, although
no one can guarantee what the courts will ultimately do with the new
law. The ADAAA specifically overturns previous Supreme Court precedent that was particularly detrimental to plaintiffs with mental illnesses.
This includes the rule requiring plaintiffs to be viewed in their mitigated
state, and the making stricter of the definition of “substantially limits.”
In addition to overturning bad decisions by the Supreme Court,
Congress, with the assistance of the EEOC Regulations, specifically instructs the courts that the main determination needs to be whether the
employee was discriminated against, not whether the employee is or
is not disabled. Additionally, the new law and regulations make clear
that mental illnesses should be considered disabilities, either in that
they do substantially limit a range of major life activities, including
thinking and interacting with others, or in that they affect major bodily
functions of the brain or other neurological functions.
Under the ADAAA, we should see plaintiffs with mental illnesses
become more successful in their attempts to bring discrimination claims
against their employers on the basis of disability. Of course, given
that in 2009, not a single plaintiff with mental illness was successful
in their employment discrimination claim, it is not a high standard to
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overcome. Ultimately, the new law should work to help these plaintiffs, who greatly need the protection, to be successful, and hopefully
will lead to a decrease in this discrimination happening.

